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INTRODUCTION
The thirteen tax-related cases decided by the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit during its 1990 term did not disturb existing
precedents.' For the most part, these decisions followed estab-
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1. See Akutowicz v. United States, No. 90-5109 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 3, 1990) (WESTLAW,
Fed. library, Fed. Cir. file) (affirming dismissal for lack of jurisdiction over tort claim arising
from application of tax laws); Murray v. United States, No. 90-5068 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 2, 1990)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, CAFC file) (reversing sua sponte dismissal of taxpayer's pro se suit for
refund of tax, penalties, and interest, and remanding for determination of whether taxpayer
properly paid full assessment at time complaint filed); Taylor v. United States, No. 90-5050
(Fed. Cir. Sept. 25, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, CAFC file) (upholding dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction where taxpayer failed to file refund request before bringing suit for years 1985,
1986, and 1987 and remanding for determination of whether refund request filed for 1982
was within statutory period); Schiff v. United States, No. 90-5025 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 21, 1990)
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lished legal principles 2 or addressed relatively narrow issues that
will not affect most taxpayers.8 Nonetheless, four of these cases ad-
dressed very technical tax questions that deserve further analysis.
First, in Texas Eastern Corp. v. United States,4 the court examined the
issue of interest payments on income tax overpayments when over-
payments result from paying a mistaken tax deficiency in an Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) settlement. 5 Second, in Gradow v. United
States,6 the court addressed the meaning of the phrase "adequate
and full consideration" in the context 'of the estate tax.7 Third, in
(LEXIS, Genfed library, CAFC file) (upholding dismissal of refund claim and assessing pen-
alty for frivolous appeal); Tenneco, Inc. v. United States, No. 89-1699 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 8, 1990)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, CAFC file) (denying claim for recovery of partially paid excise taxes
and finding taxpayer liable as importer); Pesko v. United States, 918 F.2d 1581 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (supporting timeliness of deficiency assessment and dismissing taxpayers' refund suit
on basis of untimely assessment); Schultz v. United States, 918 F.2d 164 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(upholding award of costs to government on basis of taxpayer's liability refund suit for partial
penalty payment); Carter v. United States, 909 F.2d 1452 (Fed. Cir.) (upholding dismissal for
lack ofjurisdiction over IRS employees' overtime pay dispute covered by collective bargaining
agreement grievance procedure), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 46 (1990); Texas E. Corp. v. United
States, 907 F.2d 138 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (upholding denial of additional statutory interest and
affirming IRS offset of earlier overassessments against subsequent tax deficiencies); Trans-
america Corp. v. United States, 902 F.2d 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (upholding disallowance of
corporate taxpayer's charitable deduction claim where taxpayer retained rights in transferred
property and expected substantial benefits in return for transfer); Terry Haggerty Tire Co. v.
United States, 899 F.2d 1199 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (upholding denial of claim for recovery of
partially paid excise taxes finding taxpayer liable as importer); Danville Plywood Corp. v.
United States, 899 F.2d 3 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (disallowing corporate taxpayer's entertainment
expense deduction because neither ordinary nor necessary); Gradow v. United States, 897
F.2d 516 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (contemplating statutory requirement for bona fide sale in consider-
ation of gross estate).
2. See, e.g., Akutowicz v. United States, No. 90-5109, slip op. at 4 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 3,
1990) (WESTLAW, Fed. library, Fed. Cir. file) (following jurisdiction principles in dismissing
tort claim); Carter v. United States, 909 F.2d 1452, 1458 (Fed. Cir.) (upholding jurisdiction
principles in dismissing IRS employee overtime pay dispute for lack ofjurisdiction), cert. de-
nied, 111 S. Ct. 46 (1990); Transamerica Corp. v. United States, 902 F.2d 1540, 1546 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) (relying on general principle that when taxpayer makes donation with expectation
of receipt of substantial benefits, no deductible charitable contribution is permitted under
§ 170); Danville Plywood Corp. v. United States, 899 F.2d 3, 5 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (applying
ordinary and necessary standard to entertainment expenses in determining deductibility as
business expenses).
3. See, e.g., Murray v. United States, No. 90-5068, slip op. at 3 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 2, 1990)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, CAFC file) (requiring fact-finding process on remand to determine
whether taxpayer properly paid full assessment at time that taxpayer filed complaint); Taylor
v. United States, No. 90-5050, slip op. at 1 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 25, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library,
CAFC file) (finding no jurisdiction where taxpayer failed to comply with pre-litigation filing
requirement); Schiff v. United States, No. 90-5025, slip op. at 4 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 21, 1990)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, CAFC file) (finding appeal untimely); Schultz v. United States, 918
F.2d 164, 166 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (affirming Claims Court rules governing litigation expense
reimbursement).
4. 907 F.2d 138 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
5. Texas E. Corp. v. United States, 907 F.2d 138, 141 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see infra notes
15-38 and accompanying text (analyzing court's opinion in detail).
6. 897 F.2d 516 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
7. Gradow v. United States, 897 F.2d 516, 519 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see infra notes 39-73
and accompanying text (analyzing court's opinion in detail).
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Tery Haggerty Tire Co. v. United States,8 the court interpreted the term
"importer" under the federal excise tax statute.9 Fourth, in Danville
Plywood Corp. v. United States 10 the court distinguished between busi-
ness expenses that are and are not deductible.11
The Federal Circuit generally affirmed Claims Court decisions, 12
often quoting passages from the lower court's opinions.1 3 The Fed-
eral Circuit appeared unwilling to adopt equitable or novel ap-
proaches to solving tax law problems.14 Consequently, the 1990
term decisions neither spark the types of controversies that legal
scholars relish nor lead to erroneous legal conclusions or misguided
legal interpretations that practitioners despise.
I. INTEREST ON DEFICIENCIES AND OVERPAYMENTS
The Internal Revenue Code (IRC or Code) generally provides for
the accrual of interest on tax underpayments and overpayments.1 5
IRS audits often result in adjustments to the taxpayer's taxable in-
come. As a result, tax deficiencies and overpayments may be deter-
mined for the audited periods. The amount of accrued interest on
each underpayment and overpayment over several years is often dif-
ficult to track and the obfuscatory statutory language only makes
this determination more difficult. The Federal Circuit confronted
such a problem in Texas Eastern Corp. v. United States.16 The court in
Texas Eastern held that the IRS need not pay interest on overassess-
ments where the overassessment did not result in additional pay-
8. 899 F.2d 1199 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
9. Terry Haggerty Tire Co., Inc. v. United States, 899 F.2d 1199, 1203 (Fed. Cir.
1990); see infra notes 74-109 and accompanying text (analyzing court's opinion in detail).
10. 899 F.2d 3 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
11. Danville Plywood Corp. v. United States, 899 F.2d 3, 9 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see infra
notes 110-28 and accompanying text (analyzing court's opinion in detail).
12. See, e.g., Schiffv. United States, No. 90-5025, slip op. at 7 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 21, 1990)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, CACF file) (affirming Claims Court on procedural issue relating to
statute of limitations); Texas E. Corp. v. United States, 907 F.2d 138, 141 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(affirming issue of interest payments on tax payments), aff'g 18 Cl. Ct. 387 (1989); Gradow v.
United States, 897 F.2d 516, 519 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (affirming Claims Court on estate tax issue),
af'g 11 Cl. Ct. 808 (1987).
13. See Texas E. Corp., 907 F.2d at 138, 140 (adopting conclusions of Claims Court);
Gradow, 897 F.2d at 518 (relying on Claims Court's analysis of whether taxpayer's transfer was
for full and adequate consideration within meaning of section 2036(a)).
14. Texas E. Corp., 907 F.2d at 140 (refusing to apply regulation allowing statutory inter-
est on erroneously paid deficiency interest).
15. See I.R.C. § 6601(a) (1986) (setting forth rules regarding interest on underpay-
ments); id. § 6611 (setting forth rules regarding interest on overpayments). These interest
rates are established eachJanuary, April,July, and October for the following calendar quarter
and are based on the average market yield during the first month of the preceding quarter of
outstanding United States obligations with a remaining term of three years or less. See id.
§§ 6621 (a), (b)(1), 1274(d)(1)(C)(i) (explaining how Commissioner sets interest rates).
16. 907 F.2d 138 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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ments by the taxpayer, but rather only delayed the refund of an
overpayment made following an audit.17
The IRS audited Texas Eastern's income tax returns for the years
1970 through 1974 and, in 1979, determined that the taxpayer
owed additional taxes for 1970, 1973, and 1974 and also found that
Texas Eastern had overpaid its 1971 and 1972 taxes.' 8 The IRS ap-
plied the taxpayer's 1971 and 1972 overpayments to the 1970, 1973,
and 1974 deficiencies. 19 Thus, the taxpayer owed the government
17. Texas E. Corp. v. United States, 907 F.2d 138, 140 (Fed. Cir. 1990), aff'g 18 Cl. Ct.
387 (1989).
18. See id. at 139 n.3 (disclosing amount of 1971 and 1972 overpayments and 1970,
1973, and 1974 deficiencies). The taxes overpaid and owed for the years at issue were:
Deficiency Overpayments
1970 $ 943,214.65
1971 $ 9,916,143.21
1972 10,208,623.06
1973 6,264,347.14
1974 10,553,859.77
Id.
19. Id. at 139 (recounting facts). The Code provides that deficiency interest be assessed
on underpayments, and that statutory interest be levied on overpayments. See I.R.C. § 6601
(1986) (providing for deficiency interest); id. § 6611 (providing for statutory interest). In gen-
eral, the taxpayer pays deficiency interest for the period commencing on the date that a tax
liability is due and ending on the date that the taxpayer ultimately pays the tax in full. Id.
§ 6601(a). In addition, the government pays statutory interest to the taxpayer which accrues
from the date an overpayment arises to the date that the service credits the overpayment to
another taxpayer liability, or (if the amount is refunded) to a date shortly before the IRS
issues the refund check. Id. § 6611 (b)(1)-(2).
The Code authorizes the IRS to apply overpayments from one tax year against any out-
standing deficiency from another tax year and allows the Service to refund any excess to the
taxpayer. Id. § 6402(a). In the case of an underpayment where the taxpayer owes deficiency
interest, such interest is abated when the IRS can credit an overpayment to the amount owed.
See id. § 6601(0 (providing for satisfaction by credits). In addition, an overpayment from one
tax year may offset not only a tax deficiency from another year, but interest on such deficiency
as well. See id. § 6601(g) (maintaining that interest is to be assessed and collected as if it were
tax); see also Texas E. Corp. v. United States, 907 F.2d 138, 140 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (noting
that for years at issue in case, § 6601(f) was designated 6601(g) and 6601(g) was designated
6601(h)). Interest is denied during the period in which interest would have accrued had the
credit not been made. See S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 99 (1958), reprinted in 1958
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4791, 4888, and in 1958-3 C.B. 1155, 1156, 1177 (explain-
ing congressional attempt to eliminate erratic effects on taxpayers when both overpayments
and underpayments exist by terminating interest as to both during period in which they offset
one another, except deficiency interest will be charged for any period in which overpayment
interest would not have been allowed if overpayment was not credited against deficiency).
Thus, if any portion of a tax is satisfied by credit of an overpayment, no interest is imposed on
the portion of the tax satisfied for any period during which interest would have been allowable
both on the underpayment and on the overpayment if the overpayment had been refunded.
See Treas. Reg. § 301.6601-1(b)(1) (as amended in 1983) (prohibiting interest imposition on
tax for any period in which overpayment interest would have been permitted had overpay-
ment been refunded rather than used to satisfy tax liability).
The following examples illustrate these complex rules:
Example 1: A 1989 overpayment is credited against a 1988 deficiency. No interest is payable
on the overpayment because the due date of the 1988 deficiency precedes the date of the
1989 overpayment, i.e., because tax is generally due at the same time as the required filing
date for that tax. I.R.C. § 6151 (1986).
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interest for 1970 and the government owed the taxpayer interest for
1971 and 1972, offset by the deficiencies in 1973 and 1974. This
netting process resulted in a refund to the taxpayer of
$5,425,690.47, consisting of $2,363,344.71 in overassessments for
1972 and $3,062,345.76 in statutory interest. 20
Subsequent to an agreement reached in 1979, Texas Eastern pur-
sued claims relating to depreciation deductions for the 1970
through 1974 tax years. In 1983, the taxpayer and the IRS reached
a further agreement that resulted in a recomputation of the tax-
payer's liabilities for 1970 through 1974.21 The IRS paid interest on
the tax overpayments from the dates the tax payments were made to
the date that the Service issued the refunds. The taxpayer alleged,
however, that when computing the taxpayer's refund in the 1979
agreement, the interest computation should include a statutory in-
terest payment on the deficiency interest deemed paid on the 1970,
1973, and 1974 deficiencies. 22
Example 2: If a 1989 overpayment is credited against a 1990 deficiency, interest is allowed on
the overpayment from the date of the overpayment to the due date of the payment of the tax
in the subsequent year, i.e., the due date of the 1990 tax return.
20. Texas E. Corp., 907 F.2d at 139 (reviewing IRS actions taken following results of 1970
audit).
21. Id. at 140. The taxpayer's recomputed tax liability is as follows:
Deficiency Overassessment
1970 $ 589,773.11
1971 12,020,372.23
1972 11,473,928.12
1973 7,482,468.75
1974 $5,557,478.84
Id. at 139 n.5. These redeterminations, coupled with the 1979 determinations, resulted in the
following refund amounts:
1983 1979
Overpayment/ Overpayment/
Overassessed Taxes Deficiency Deficiency
1970 $1,532,987.76 (S 589,773.11 + $ 943,214.65)
1971 2,104,229.02 (12,020,372.23 - 9,916,143.21)
1972 1,265,305.06 (11,473,928.12 - 10,208,623.06)
1973 13,746,815.89 (7,482,468.75 + 6,264,347.14)
1974 (4,996,380.93) (5,557,478.84 - 10,553,859.77)
Id. at 140 n.6.
22. See Brief for Appellant at 14-15, Texas E. Corp. v. United States, 907 F.2d 138 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) (No. 90-5029) (setting forth taxpayer's allegations). The essence of the dispute
may be illustrated as follows:
Example 1: Taxpayer overpays taxes by $500 in year 1. In year 5, the IRS agrees to the refund;
the applicable interest rate is 10%.
Refund
Overpayment $50
Statutory Interest ($500 X 4 yrs. X 10%) 200
Refund
Example 2: Rather than grant the refund, the IRS in year 5, assesses a $200 deficiency with
respect to Year 2 and offsets it against the $500 overpayment.
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The taxpayer asserted that statutory interest was due as part of
the 1983 refund on the deemed deficiency interest payment as-
sessed in 1979 and urged the court to look to the equities of the
statutory interest rule.23 A taxpayer is generally entitled to statutory
interest with respect to any overpayment. 24 The regulations man-
date that the payment of deficiency interest may constitute part of
an overpayment. 25 The taxpayer alleged that adoption of the IRS
approach would result in the IRS having use of deficiency interest
that is subsequently refunded without the payment of statutory in-
terest on those funds. 26
These arguments did not persuade the court. Instead, the court
advocated the general rule that interest can be collected from the
United States only where its payment has been authorized, regard-
less of whether the government controlled the taxpayer's funds. 27
Refund
Overpayment $500
Less: Deficiency Offset 200
300
Statutory Interest:
Pre-Offset ($500 X 10% X I yr.) $ 50
Post-Offset ($300 X 10% X 3 yrs.) 90
Refund $440
Example 3: In year 7, the IRS concedes that the $200 deficiency should not have been made.
The taxpayer's position is that the refund should be $260 ($700 -$440) plus interest from the
time that the IRS wrongfully assessed the $200 deficiency.
Refund
Amount Deprived Taxpayer $260
Statutory Interest ($260 X 10% X 2 yrs.) 52
Refund $312
The IRS, on the other hand, determined the refund to be $200 plus interest from Year 2.
Refund
Overpayment $200
Statutory Interest ($200 X 10% X 5 yrs.) 100
Refund $300
The difference between the taxpayer's and government's positions represents the statutory
interest that accrued on the deficiency interest paid on the erroneous $200 deficiency from
the end of Year 2 to the end of Year 5 ($200 x 10% x 3 yrs. x 10% x 2 yrs). See Texas E. Corp.
v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 387, 390, 391 n.8 (1989) (offering example to illustrate taxpayer's
contention that interest owed taxpayer credited by IRS to pay deficiency should accrue over-
payment interest).
23. Texas E. Corp., 907 F.2d at 140 (rejecting taxpayer's claim for additional interest on
interest it claims should be deemed to have been paid).
24. See supra note 19 (discussing taxpayer's entitlement to statutory interest).
25. See Treas. Reg. § 301.6611-1(c) Ex. 2 as amended in 1976 (explaining through exam-
ple that in addition to taxes overpaid, deficiency interest paid to government on tax overpaid
is considered part of tax overpayment for purposes of computing overpayment interest).
26. See Brief for Appellant at 14-15, Texas E. Corp. v. United States, 907 F.2d 138, 140
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (No. 90-5029) (contending entitlement to overpayment interest on interest
deemed paid).
27. See United States ex rel. Angarica v. Bayard, 127 U.S. 251, 260 (1888) (expressing
general rule that government need not pay interest claims absent statutory provision).
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Thus, to collect overpayment interest, the taxpayer must show spe-
cific statutory authority for the collection. In contrast, the general
rule regarding tax underpayments is that underpayment interest ac-
crues from the date the taxes are due to the date the taxes are paid
in full.2 8 In cases where an underpayment offsets an overpayment,
deficiency interest does not accrue on the portion of the tax so satis-
fied by credit for any period during which, if the credit had not been
made, interest would have been allowed with respect to such over-
payment.29 Thus, the court found that the crediting of the 1971
overpayment against the 1970 deficiency precluded, as a matter of
law, the imposition of additional deficiency interest as well as the
imposition of deficiency interest on the 1973, and 1974 deficien-
cies.30 Consequently, the taxpayer never paid any deficiency inter-
est with respect to the 1970, 1973 and 1974 deficiencies except for
interest on the 1970 deficiency that had accrued prior to the date
the 1971 overpayment was made.3 1 The court concluded, therefore,
that the taxpayer was not entitled to statutory interest on any defi-
ciency interest.32
Texas Eastern argued that section 6601(f) should not govern the
facts of the case and claimed that the statutory rule for crediting
interest does not apply to an offset involving erroneous deficien-
cies.33 Using the legislative history as support, the taxpayer con-
tended that section 6601 (f) should operate only when actual, mutual
indebtedness exists.3 4 The taxpayer relied on Fruehauf Corp. v.
28. See supra note 19 (discussing 6601(a) provision which provides general rule).
29. See id. (explaining section 6601(0 which sets out rules regarding accrual of deficiency
interest when underpayment exceeds overpayment).
30. Texas E. Corp., 907 F.2d at 140.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. (noting taxpayer's argument that erroneous deficiency without mutuality of inter-
est due from government and taxpayer precludes application of provision).
34. Id. at 141; see also S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 235, reprinted in 1958 U.S.
CODE & CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4791, 5023, and in 1958-3 C.B. 1155, 1158 (providing legisla-
tive history). The legislative commentary explained that interest will be denied to the govern-
ment on "any portion of an underpayment satisfied by the crediting against it of an
overpayment for the period during which interest would run on the overpayment so credited
if the credit had not been made, e.g., if it had instead been refunded." Id. In addition, the
legislative history expressed Congress' intent to "remove the distinction now existing in the
running of interest where the overpayment is credited against an underpayment of original
tax and where it is credited against an additional assessment." Id. The legislative history
called for interest on a credited overpayment to:
run only from the date of the overpayment to the original due date of the amount
against which it is credited. Thus, if it is credited against an underpayment antedat-
ing the overpayment, no interest would run on the overpayment at all. Since interest
would otherwise run on the overpayment from the date of overpayment to the date
of refund, interest on the underpayment will stop running as of the date of the over-
payment; that is, when the mutuality of indebtedness arises. Similarly, in the case of an
overpayment which antedates the due date of an underpayment, interest will run on
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United States3 5 to support its position.36 The court in Texas Eastern
stated that it did not see how Fruehauf applied to the taxpayer's situ-
ation. In Fruehauf, the taxpayer underpaid its 1960 taxes, but a 1963
net operating loss created a carryback that eliminated the 1960 un-
derpayment. The government assessed deficiency interest in 1969
and the taxpayer's right to interest on the refund of the net operat-
ing loss commenced in 1963. The Fruehauf court concluded that the
taxpayer's right to statutory interest from 1963 through 1969
should be offset by the 1969 deficiency interest.37
Thus, the court characterized Texas Eastern's case as one where
the IRS had delayed refunding the correct tax until 1983 and not
one where the taxpayer had overpaid its 1979 taxes. Accordingly,
the court held that the taxpayer was not entitled to statutory interest
on any alleged deficiency interest because no such deficiency inter-
est had been paid.38
II. ESTATE TAXATION
Estate taxation involves an initial determination of a gross estate's
value. The value of a gross estate generally includes the value of all
property transferred in which a decedent has retained a life inter-
est.3 9 A transfer of property with a retained life interest may be ex-
cluded from the gross estate, however, if it is deemed a "bona fide
sale for an adequate and full consideration." 40 The court consid-
ered the meaning of that phrase in Gradow v. United States.4 1 The
case concerned Betty and Alexander Gradow who at all times re-
sided in California, a community property state. 42 Alexander, who
the overpayment only until such due date, that is, when the mutuality of indebtedness
arises.
Id. (emphasis added).
35. 477 F.2d 568 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
36. Freuhauf Corp. v. United States, 477 F.2d 568, 569 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (holding taxpayers
not liable for interest on potential deficiency and finding no mutuality of indebtedness where
operating loss was carried back, extinguishing potential deficiency and creating
overassessment).
37. Id. at 573 (applying Code consistent with congressional intent to eliminate inequities
in operation of interest requirements on taxpayer and government for deficiency and overpay-
ment interest charges).
38.. Texas E. Corp. v. United States, 907 F.2d 138, 140 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (expressing
court's holding).
39. See I.R.C. § 2036(a) (1986) (excluding from value of decedent's gross estate amount
of any property which has been transferred by way of "bona fide sale for an adequate and full
consideration").
40. See id. (noting exception to property included in gross estate's value).
41. 897 F.2d 516 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
42. See Gradow v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 808, 809 (1987) (providing factual back-
ground), aft'd, 897 F.2d 516 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see also BLACK's LAw DiCTIONARY 280 (6th ed.
1990) (noting that California is community property state). The difference between a com-
mon law property state and a community property state focuses on married persons' property
1242
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died in 1977, bequeathed his interest in the couple's community
property to a trust for Betty for life with the remainder to their son,
but only if Betty affirmatively elected not to claim her "widow's
share" under California's community property law.43 Betty re-
frained from making a "widow's share" election and instead elected
to transfer her own share in the community property to a trust from
which she would receive the income for life.4 4
Betty died less than sixteen months after making the election.45
Her executor excluded the value of the trust property from her
gross estate for federal estate tax purposes.46 The IRS, on audit,
reasoned that Betty had made a "testamentary transfer" with a re-
served life estate that would subject the transferred amount to estate
tax under section 2036.47 In essence, the IRS treated Betty's elec-
tion to have her share of the community property pass to a trust for
her lifetime benefit as a section 2036(a) transfer.48 The IRS con-
ceded that in exchange for the transfer of her community property
interest to the trust, Betty received consideration in the form of a
life estate in both her own and Alexander's community property.49
The parties stipulated the value of this life estate to be $234,767.50
rights. Id. In essence, community property law considers one-half of each spouse's earnings
as owned by the other spouse. Id.
43. Gradow, I I Cl. Ct. at 809.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. A decedent's gross estate includes "the value of all property to the extent of any
interest therein of the decedent at the time of his death." I.R.C. § 2033 (1986). Because this
rule may be easily avoided unless it also reaches property that a decedent gives away during
his life by an essentially testamentary transfer that makes a gift of property with a reserved life
estate, section 2036 provides in pertinent part:
(a) General Rule. The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property
to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a
transfer (except in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise, under which he has retained for his
life, or for any period not ascertainable without reference to his death, or for any
period which does not in fact end before his death:
(1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the property,
or
(2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to designate the per-
sons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom.
Id. § 2036. Thus, this provision extends the estate tax to any property that the decedent gives
away for less than adequate and full consideration during his life while retaining a life estate in
the property. Gradow v. United States, 897 F.2d 516, 518 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (noting this propo-
sition). This rule also applies where the decedent does not have such power at death but did
have such power at any time within three years of death. I.R.C. § 2035(a), (d)(1)-(2) (1986)
(stating rule).
48. Gradow, 897 F.2d at 517 (asserting that failure to include contributed property's
value created deficiency in estate taxes).
49. Id. (noting that by transferring her portion of community property into trust of both
spouses, she would receive all income for life).
50. Id. at 518 n.6 (reciting net consideration received).
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The IRS subtracted this value ($234,767) from the value of the
property contributed to the trust ($444,641).51
On appeal, the dispute focused on the value of the property trans-
ferred into the trust, and consequently, whether that value was "ad-
equate and full" in return for the $234,767 life estate. 52 The
government contended the value of the transferred property was
$444,641, the stipulated value of Betty's entire community property
interest at the time of Alexander's death, and, under section 2036,
assessed additional estate tax on the difference. 53 The estate, how-
ever, contended that the value of the transfer equalled only the
value of the remainder interest in the trust passing to the remainder
person at the death of Betty, stipulated to be less than $234,767. 54
The Circuit Court, like the Claims Court, relied on three prior
decisions for its adoption of the government's position. The first
case relied on by the court was United States v. Allen. 55 In Allen, the
decedent created an inter vivos trust reserving the income for life
with the remainder to her children.56 Shortly before her death, she
51. Id. at 518 (allowing credit against amount of transfer).
52. Id. (noting both executor's and government's positions).
53. Id. (stating that consideration equalled half of community property).
54. Id. (noting consideration was value of remainder interest in half of community prop-
erty).
This dispute may be explained by a simple example. Assume husband (H) and wife (W)
own $200,000 of community property. H's will provides that W may take her one-half interest
in the property at H's death or may permit the couple's entire property of $200,000 to pass to
a trust in which she is given a life estate. By choosing to receive the life estate, W performs
two actions: (1) she elects to waive her statutory right to one-half of the community property,
and (2) she transfers her one-half property interest to the trust. In return for these transfers,
W acquires a life estate in the entire $200,000. If the value of the life estate is worth $60,000
based on mortality tables then in effect, see Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-10, Table A(2) (1989)
(providing present worth of annuity, life interest, and remainder interest of single female), the
government's position would be that W transferred her statutory $100,000 property interest
for $60,000 consideration, and therefore, no bona fide sale for adequate and full considera-
tion occurred for section 2036 purposes. The estate, however, could contend that W trans-
ferred $40,000 (the beneficiary's remainder interest) for $60,000 consideration, resulting in
adequate and full consideration. For commentary on this issue prior to the Gradow decision,
see, Johnson, Revocable Trusts, Widow's Election Wills, and Community Property: The Tax Problems,
47 TEX. L. Ray. 1247, 1282 (1969) (recognizing that case law allows wife's gross estate to be
offset by electing life estate in husband's community share); Lowndes, Consideration and the
Federal Estate and Gift Taxes: Transfers for Partial Consideration, Relinquishment of Marital Rights,
Family Annuities, the Widow's Election, and Reciprocal Trusts, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50, 76 (1966)
(proclaiming unsoundness of widow's election because it offers opportunities for tax avoid-
ance in community property states); Miller & Martin, Voluntary Widow's Election: Nationwide
Planning for the Million Dollar Estate, I CAL. W.L. REV. 63, 81 (1965) (noting major purpose of
transfer is to avoid inclusion in gross estate of property interests transferred by wife by requir-
ing transfer be made for "full and adequate consideration in money or money's worth"); Mor-
rison, The Widow's Election: The Issue of Consideration, 44 TEx. L. REV. 223, 242 (1965)
(recommending adoption of general value rather than dollar amount, to measure considera-
tion received as fraction of property interest transferred by wife).
55. 293 F.2d 916 (10th Cir. 1961).
56. United States v. Allen, 293 F.2d 916, 916 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 944 (1961).
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sold her life estate for slightly more than its actuarial value.57 Rep-
resentatives of the estate argued that the trust property could not be
brought back into the estate under section 2036 because the dece-
dent's life interest was transferred for adequate and full considera-
tion.58 The Tenth Circuit held that the sale of the life estate was not
made for adequate and full consideration.5 9 The court reasoned
that the measure of the consideration for the life estate transfer was
not the value of the decedent's life interest, but was instead the
value of the trust corpus, that is, the property that would have been
included in the gross estate had the decedent not made the trans-
fer.60 Thus, the decedent was treated as having transferred not the
life estate, but the full value of the trust corpus. 6'
The second case relied on by the Gradow court was Estate of Gregory
v. Commissioner.62 In Estate of Gregory, the decedent, -prior to her
death, did not exercise her widow's election. 6 This resulted in her
community property, worth approximately $70,000, passing to a
trust established by her husband's will. In exchange she received a
life interest in the trust with an actuarial value of approximately
$12,000.64 The Tax Court held that, under section 2036, the trans-
fer was not for "adequate and full consideration."6 5 The Gregory
court ruled that "[t]he statute excepts only those bona fide sales
where the consideration received was of comparable value which
would be includable in the transferor's gross estate."66 In addition,
the Tax Court rejected the estate's argument that the decedent's
retained life interest in her own share of the community property
should be counted as consideration for the transfer.67
Finally, the Gradow court relied on United States v. Past.68 In Past,
57. Id.
58. Id. at 917. Section 2035(d) provides that if a decedent releases or transfers for less
than adequate and full consideration, a power under section 2036 within three years of death,
the power is considered as if held at death under section 2036. I.R.C. § 2035(d) (1986). This
rule prevents "gifts in contemplation of death" whereby the decedent, in anticipation of his
death, depletes his estate by transferring assets out of his estate with the intent to minimize
estate tax. See H.R. REP. No. 1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1976) (setting forth legislative
history of § 2035(d)).
59. See Allen, 293 F.2d at 917 (recognizing that consideration exceeded life estate's
value).
60. See id. at 918 (noting Congress' intent).
61. Id.
62. 39 T.C. 1012 (1963).
63. Estate of Gregory v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 1012, 1013 (1963).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1016.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1017 (reasoning that retained life estate in one's own property cannot serve as
consideration for adequate and full consideration requirement of section 2036 because dece-
dent retains that property interest rather than transfers it to trust).
68. 347 F.2d 7 (9th Cir. 1965).
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the community property of each spouse, pursuant to a divorce set-
tlement, went to a trust in which the wife acquired a life interest.69
The value of her share of the community property transferred to the
trust was about $244,000; the remainder interest in such property
was valued at about $101,000; and the value of her life estate in the
whole trust corpus was approximately $144,000.70 The Ninth Cir-
cuit ruled that the transfer was not for "adequate and full considera-
tion" under section 2036.71
Finding these cases controlling, the Federal Circuit in Gradow af-
firmed the Claims Court decision favoring the government's inter-
pretation of the value of the property that was transferred into the
trust.7 2 The court reiterated that for purposes of measuring
whether "full and adequate consideration" was given for the life es-
tate, the consideration consists of the decedent's half of the commu-
nity property.7 3
III. EXCISE TAXES
Tax cases frequently involve the problem of determining who,
among several potential taxpayers, is the proper party to tax. 74 This
issue, as well as the ancient adage caveat emptor,75 was made painfully
evident to the taxpayer in Teny Haggerty Tire Co. v. United States.76 In
Haggerty Tire, a divided court upheld a Claims Court summary judg-
ment that found a United States buyer of tires liable for excise taxes
on its purchases where the entity importing the tires, and otherwise
liable for the tax, was a foreign corporation inaccessible to IRS col-
lection procedures. 77
Terry Haggerty Tire Co. ("Haggerty"), a New York corporation
engaged in the business of selling tires on both a retail and a whole-
sale basis was approached by representatives of Canada Tire Co.
69. United States v. Past, 347 F.2d 7, 10 (9th Cir. 1965).
70. Id at 14.
71. Id. at 12 (stating that "value of what the decedent received under the trust
[$144,000] must be measured against the value of the property she transferred to the trust
[$244,000 and not $101,000]").
72. See Gradow v. United States, 897 F.2d 516, 519 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (adopting Claims
Court's analysis).
73. See id. at 518 (observing absence of full and adequate consideration under section
2036(a)).
74. E.g., Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 115 (1930) (reporting Justice Holmes' famous
"fruit and tree" analogy for determining who is taxed on income earned by one person but
received by another person).
75. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 222 (6th ed. 1990) (expressing maxim "let the buyer
beware" as summary for rule that purchaser must inspect for himself.
76. 899 F.2d 1199 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
77. Terry Haggerty Tire Co. v. United States, 899 F.2d 1199, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 1990), afl'g
16 Cl. Ct. 620 (1989).
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("Canada Tire") to solicit orders for tires.78 Canada Tire was a Ca-
nadian corporation with no business facilities in the United States.79
Haggerty was aware that it was purchasing tires from a foreign man-
ufacturer.80 The companies negotiated the price of each order in-
cluding: the cost of the tires, freight charges, brokerage fees, and
customs duties. 8' Haggerty and Canada Tire disagreed, however,
over whether the payment of excise taxes was included in the
price.8 2 No written agreements existed describing the business
transactions.83
After Haggerty placed an order, Canada Tire either shipped the
tires from its warehouse in Canada or arranged to have the tires
released from those held at a bonded customs warehouse in Ver-
mont.8 4 The tires stored in the bonded warehouse had not yet
cleared customs, and therefore, they were treated as not yet having
entered the United States.85 Once a specific order was placed, Can-
ada Tire paid the customs duty and caused the customs broker to
ship the tires to the United States purchaser.8 6 The tires were
shipped to the taxpayer in New York with the taxpayer retaining the
right to refuse shipment if the goods were defective.8 7
The issue in this case hinged on the definition of "importer" for
purposes of the assessment of an excise tax on tires.88 Section 4071
imposes an excise tax on the importer of tires used on highway vehi-
cles.89 In defining the term "importer," the regulations provide
that where an entity is the mere nominee of the beneficial owner,
the beneficial owner is the "importer" of the article and will be lia-
ble for the excise tax.90 The taxpayer argued that Canada Tire was
not its nominee but was in fact the real owner of the goods until
78. Id. at 1199.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1199-1200.
82. Id. at 1200.
83. See id. at 1199-1200 (noting that Haggerty placed orders either through representa-
tives or over telephone).
84. Id. at 1200.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Terry Haggerty Tire Co. v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 620, 621 (1989).
88. Terry Haggerty Tire Co. v. United States, 899 F.2d 1199, 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(observing importance of finding true meaning of "importer").
89. See I.R.C. § 4071 (1986) (imposing tire tax).
90. See Treas. Reg. § 48.0-2(a)(4)(i) (1988) (defining importer). The Treasury Regula-
tion defines "importer" as any person bringing an article into the United States from outside
the United States, "or who withdraws such an article from a customs bonded warehouse for
sale or use in the United States." Id. If the article's named importer is not its beneficial
owner, such as when the importer is a customs broker employed by the beneficial owner, the
beneficial owner is the "importer" for federal tax purposes. Id.
1991] 1247
1248 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW[Vol. 40:1235
they were delivered to the taxpayer. Haggerty, therefore, claimed it
had no ownership interest in any specific tires until they were deliv-
ered and accepted. 9 1 Thus, the taxpayer's position centered on the
fact that Canada Tire was not a mere agent, but rather its own
principal.92
The majority chose to ignore the issue of whether Canada Tire
was its own principal. In affirming the Claims Court ruling that
Haggerty, and not Canada Tire, was the importer, the court held
that the determination of who is the "importer" turns on who is
"the inducing and efficient cause of the importation," that is, which
party is "primarily responsible" for causing the tires to enter the
United States. 93 Accordingly, technical rules involving place of sale
and transfer of title are irrelevant. 94 The court reasoned that if such
technical rules were adopted, it would be impossible to enforce col-
lection of the tax if the taxpayer were a foreign corporation or resi-
dent with no contacts with the United States.95
This holding, the court noted, had been the announced position
of the IRS in several revenue rulings, 96 one of which presented facts
virtually identical to Terry Haggerty. In Revenue Ruling 68-197,97 a
domestic corporation arranged to purchase goods, which were sub-
ject to a federal manufacturer's excise tax, from a foreign corpora-
91. See Terry Haggerty Tire Co., 16 Cl. Ct. at 621-22 (declaring that Canada Tire should be
"importer" liable for excise tax because it shipped tires to customs warehouse without ex-
isting order for tires from domestic company).
92. See id. at 622 (citing Handley Motor Co. v. United States, 338 F.2d 361, 364 (Ct, Cl.
1964) (pronouncing determination of who is "importer" depends on who arranges for ship-
ment as principal and not as agent)). 1
93. See Terry Haggerty Tire Co. v. United States, 899 F.2d 1199, 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(quoting Import Wholesalers Corp. v. United States, 368 F.2d 577, 585 (Ct. Cl. 1966)); see also
Corex Corp. v. United States, 524 F.2d 1017, 1020-21 (9th Cir.) (holding that plaintiff was
"importer" subject to tax because unincorporated association assumed functions of importer
but did not perform substantial promotional activities, bear unusual risks, or earn significant
profit), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 912 (1975); Sony Corp. of Am. v. United States, 428 F.2d 1258,
1265-66 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (asserting that plaintiff subdistributer was not "importer" where cor-
poration retained initiative for introducing products into United States and engaged in pro-
motional activities).
94. See Terry Haggerty Tire Co., 899 F.2d at 1200 (citing Import Wholesalers Corp. v.
United States, 368 F.2d 577, 583 (Ct. Cl. 1966) (noting determination of "importer" does not
turn on technical rules such as sales law)).
95. See Terry Haggerty Tire Co., 899 F.2d at 1201 (citing Handley Motor Co. v. United
States, 338 F.2d 361, 364 (Ct. CL. 1964) (remarking that persons or corporations in foreign
country are inaccessible to collection procedures)).
96. See Rev. Rul. 69-393, 1969-2 C.B. 206 (noting necessity to look through transaction's
form to its substance in determining whether nominal importer actually functions as typical
import merchant or merely serves in representative capacity for bringing articles into United
States); Rev. Rul. 67-209, 1967-1 C.B. 297 (stating that subsidiary in United States is consid-
ered "importer" of taxable articles when foreign company organizes subsidiary in United
States to market certain articles).
97. Rev. Rul. 68-197, 1968-1 C.B. 455.
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tion.98 The foreign corporation shipped the goods directly to
locations in the United States where the domestic corporation had
offices, and the domestic corporation then distributed and sold the
products.99 The foreign corporation controlled the products
through delivery, paid customs duties, and retained title until deliv-
ery.100 In addition, the foreign corporation employed a customs
broker in the United States to assist in clearing the goods through
customs.' 0 ' The IRS concluded that because the foreign corpora-
tion was only a conduit, the domestic company was the true "im-
porter" for purposes of determining who was responsible for paying
the excise tax.' 02
In a footnote, the majority dismissed Haggerty's assertion that
Canada Tire maintained a "permanent establishment" within the
United States for purposes of the United States-Canada Income Tax
Convention and was, therefore, the first United States resident pur-
chaser of the tires.'0 3 Under Haggerty's reasoning, as the first
United States resident purchaser of the goods, Canada Tire, and not
Haggerty, was liable for the excise tax.' 0 4 The court noted, how-
98. Id. at 455.
99. Id. at 456.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. The ruling states in relevant part:
In the instant case, [the foreign corporation] is not engaged in selling articles in the
United States. The technicalities of the import procedure, as a matter of fact, are
subordinate to and geared to the needs and demands of [the domestic corporation].
Furthermore, the [foreign corporation's] broker serves merely as a conduit through
which the merchandise is cleared through customs for delivery.to [the domestic cor-
poration]. Thus, the fact that [the foreign corporation] agrees to incur and pay all
expenses of transportation, customs clearance, and delivery or the fact that title does
not pass to [the domestic corporation] until delivery does not give [the foreign cor-
poration] any substance as an "importer" in the United States. Under such circum-
stances, [the domestic corporation] is the person in the United States who is the
inducing and efficient cause of the articles being brought into the United States for
his own sale or use.
Id.
103. See Terry Haggerty Tire Co. v. United States, 899 F.2d 1199, 1201 n.3 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (noting absence of cases or rulings in which nonresident foreign corporations have
been held to be importers). Under Article VII of the Convention Between the United States
of America and Canada with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, a Canadian citizen is
subject to United States federal income tax on all income earned in the United States that is
derived from a "permanent establishment" in the United States. Convention Between the
United States of America and Canada With Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, Sept.
26, 1980, United States-Canada, art. VII, para. 2, 1986-2 C.B. 258, 260. A permanent estab-
lishment in the United States includes a "person acting in the United States on behalf of a
Canadian resident if such person has, and habitually exercises in the United States, an author-
ity to conclude contracts in the name of the Canadian resident." Id. at art. V, para. 5, 1986-2
C.B. 258, 259-60.
104. See Handley Motor Co. v. United States, 338 F.2d 361, 364 (Ct. Cl. 1966) (stating
that "importer" for purposes of assessing excise tax is first purchaser resident in United
States who arranges (as principal and not as agent) for goods to be brought into United
States).
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ever, that the treaty relates only to the reciprocal taxation of income
and does not cover excise taxes.' 0 5 Even if the court had been will-
ing to extend the application of the treaty to excise taxes, it is un-
clear whether Canada Tire had a "permanent establishment" within
the meaning of the treaty. The taxpayer would have had to show
that Canada Tire had given its employees general authority to con-
tract, as Canada Tire had no business facilities in the United
States.10 6 Given that the contracts in this case were oral, it is un-
likely that Haggerty could have shown such authority, especially
without Canada Tire's cooperation.
The dissent ignored the problem of whether the IRS could collect
the tax from Canada Tire and found Canada Tire, and not Hag-
gerty, liable for the tax.' 0 7 The dissent emphasized that in summary
judgment decisions, the court must construe the facts in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party.108 In this case, the possi-
ble absence of a principal/agent relationship between Haggerty and
Canada Tire might make Canada Tire its own principal and "im-
porter" for purposes of the excise tax. Consequently, when con-
struing the facts in the light most favorable to Haggerty, the dissent
believed the facts suggested a closer examination and thus would
grant Haggerty a hearing on the merits. 10 9
Notwithstanding the dissent, it is unlikely that Haggerty could
prove Canada Tire's permanent establishment in the United States.
In spite of the dissent's assertion to the contrary, if Canada Tire
were found liable for the tax, the IRS would be unable to collect the
tax from Canada Tire. Whether courts should take such collection
problems into consideration when determining who is liable for spe-
cific taxes is beyond the scope of this Article.
105. Terry Haggerty Tire Co., 899 F.2d at 1201 n.3; see also Convention Between the United
States of America and Canada With Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, Sept. 26,
1980, United States-Canada, art. II, 1986-2 C.B. 258 (setting forth taxes covered).
106. See United States-Canada Income Tax Convention, Jan. 1, 1941, United States-Can-
ada, Protocol, para. 3(f), 1943 C.B. 526, 532 (maintaining that term "permanent establish-
ment" includes cases where enterprise of one of contracting states carries on business in
other contracting state through employee or agent in other state and that employee or agent
has general authority to contract for employer or principal).
107. See Terry Haggerty Tire Co., 899 F.2d at 1203 (Newman,J., dissenting) (suggesting that
IRS could collect from Canada Tire).
108. Id. at 1201 (stating that Claims Court incorrectly resolved disputed material facts
against non-movant); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 56 (providing for summary judgment in cases
where pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
moving party is entitled to judgment as matter of law).
109. See Terry Haggerty Tire Co., 899 F.2d at 1203 (Newman, J., dissenting) (suggesting
court should have vacated summary judgment to determine which party was importer).
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IV. BUSINESS EXPENSES
The courts must often address the thorny issue of determining
when an expenditure constitutes a deductible ordinary and neces-
sary business expense. 110 During the 1990 term, the Federal Circuit
considered this issue in Danville Plywood Corp. v. United States.'1 The
court in Danville Plywood upheld the Claims Court's finding that cer-
tain expenditures made during the taxpayer's 1980 and 1981 tax
years were not deductible. 112
Specifically, Danville Plywood Corporation (Danville) deducted
sizeable amounts in connection with a sales seminar it conducted in
New Orleans, Louisiana, that coincided with the 1981 Super
Bowl. 1 3 Danville paid all travel, hotel, and ticket expenses for ap-
proximately 120 persons ("attendees") primarily comprised of Dan-
ville customers, employees, spouses, and their children." 14 After an
exhaustive evidentiary examination, the Claims Court concluded
that the taxpayer did not meet its threshold burden of showing that
the Super Bowl expenses qualified as deductible ordinary and nec-
essary business expenses."15 It further held that, even if the ex-
penditures qualified as deductible business expenses, they would
not be deductible because, as entertainment expenses, they were
110. See I.R.C. § 162 (1986) (setting forth rule that taxpayers may only deduct trade or
business expenses that are ordinary and necessary).
111. 899 F.2d 3 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
112. Danville Plywood Corp. v. United States, 899 F.2d 3, 9 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (upholding
Claims Court ruling that taxpayer failed to show claimed deductions ordinary and necessary),
aff'g 16 Cl. Ct. 584 (1989).
113. See id. at 5 & n.2 (detailing expenses). These expenditures included $27,151 paid for
Super Bowl tickets, $30,722 for air fares, $45,300 for accommodations and services, and $272
for the delivery/pick-up of the Super Bowl tickets. Id.
114. Id. at 5 (reviewing list of participants).
115. See I.R.C. § 162(a) (1986) (providing deduction only for "ordinary and necessary ex-
penses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business, includ-
ing.. . traveling expenses") (emphasis added).
Only traveling expenses incurred "while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or busi-
ness" may be deducted. Id. In addition, the Regulations provide that only such travel ex-
penses that are "reasonable and necessary in the conduct of the taxpayer's business and directly
attributable to it may be deducted. If the trip is undertaken for other than business purposes, the travel
fares and expenses incident to travel are personal expenses and the meals and lodging are living expenses."
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(a) (as amended in 1958) (emphasis added). However, "[i]f the trip is
solely on business, the reasonable and necessary traveling expenses, including travel fares,
meals and lodging, and expenses incident to travel, are business expenses .... Id.
Where a taxpayer incurs travel expenses to and from a destination at which the taxpayer
"engages in both business and personal activities, traveling expenses to and from such desti-
nations are deductible only if the trip is related primarily to the taxpayer's trade or business."
Id. § 1.162-2(b) (emphasis added). In contrast, where the trip is "primarily personal in na-
ture," traveling expenses "to and from the destination are not deductible even though the
taxpayer engages in business activities while at such destination." Id. Nevertheless, expenses
incurred at the destination "properly allocable to the taxpayer's trade or business are deducti-
ble even though the traveling expenses to and from the destination are not deductible." Id.
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not "directly related to" 1 6 or "associated with""17 the active con-
duct of the taxpayer's trade or business.1 18
The Federal Circuit limited itself to a clearly erroneous standard
of review of the Claims Court's factual determinations of whether
the taxpayer met the above tests. 11 The court found that the
Claims Court's conclusions-that the expenditures were not ordi-
nary and necessary business expenses-were not clearly erroneous;
thus, it did not discuss whether the expenditure, if ordinary and nec-
essary to the taxpayer's trade or business, would have satisfied the
additional requirements of being either directly related to or associ-
ated with the trade or business. 120
Both the trial court and the Federal Circuit Court examined the
relation of the employees, customer representatives, and their
spouses to the corporation's business. As to spouses of employees
or customers, the Federal Circuit focused on whether the presence
of any spouse served a bona fide business purpose' 21 and whether
such purpose constituted the "dominant purpose" for the spouse's
attendance. 22 The court found that the taxpayer simply did not
present sufficient evidence to establish that the attendance of any
spouses or relatives satisfied those tests. 123
116. See Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2(c)(3)(i)-(iv) (as amended in 1985) (defining instances where
entertainment expenditures may be "directly related to" business). There are four require-
ments under the "directly related to" test: (1) the taxpayer must have a reasonable expecta-
tion of deriving some income or direct benefit (as opposed to goodwill) from the
entertainment; (2) the taxpayer must actively engage in a bona fide business discussion or
transaction during the entertainment; (3) the bonafide business discussion must constitute the
principal activity; and (4) the taxpayer must allocate expenses between business and nonbusi-
ness guests in attendance. Id.
117. See I.R.C. § 274(a)(1)(A) (1986) (allowing deduction for entertainment expenses "in
the case of an item directly preceding or following a substantial and bonafide business discus-
sion (including business meetings at a convention or otherwise), [where the taxpayer estab-
lishes] that such item was associated with, the active conduct of the taxpayer's trade or
business") (emphasis added).
118. See Danville Plywood Corp. v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 584, 603-08 (1989) (discuss-
ing application of section 274 requirements, notwithstanding fact that court had already con-
cluded that expenses were neither ordinary nor necessary).
119. Danville Plywood Corp. v. United States, 899 F.2d 3, 7 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (citing FED.
R. Civ. P. 52(a) (discussing standard of review)).
120. Id- at 9 (affirming Claims Court on basis of section 162 requirements and finding
unnecessary to reach section 274 requirements).
121. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(c) (as amended in 1958) (stating that expenses attributable
to travel of taxpayer's wife when accompanying spouse on business trip are not deductible
unless taxpayer can demonstrate that "wife's presence on the trip ha[d] a bona fide business
purpose"). The wife's expenses will not be deductible if she solely performs "some incidental
service." Id. These rules also extend to "other members of the taxpayer's family who accom-
pany him on such a trip." Id.
122. See Danville Plywood Corp., 899 F.2d at 8 (citing United States v. Disney, 413 F.2d 783,
788 (9th Cir. 1969) (suggesting that focus should be whether spouse's presence was to serve
business purpose and whether spouse's activities conformed to this purpose)).
123. Danville Plywood Corp., 899 F.2d at 8 (finding that spouses did not serve dominant
purpose of assisting with trip's business purpose).
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As for the expenditures attributable to the taxpayer's employees
and customers, the Federal Circuit conceded that the trip may have
increased sales and generally promoted the taxpayer's business, but
agreed that its central focus was entertainment. 124 The court
adopted the established rule that expenditures must be "appropri-
ate and helpful" to the development of the taxpayer's business to be
considered "necessary."' 125 The court also concluded that to qualify
as "ordinary," an expenditure must be "normal, usual, or custom-
ary"'126 in order to properly distinguish it from an expenditure that
must be capitalized and depreciated.127 Applying these standards to
the evidence presented to the Claims Court, the Federal Circuit
could not overturn the lower court's findings as dearly
erroneous.
128
V. STATUTE OF LIMrrATIONS
Another major issue addressed by the Federal Circuit focused on
the finality of Tax Court decisions. Section 6213(a) prohibits the
IRS from commencing collection activity against a taxpayer until
ninety days after the Service mails a notice of deficiency to the tax-
payer. 129 If the taxpayer files a petition in the Tax Court, however,
the normal three-year statute of limitations for assessing tax 130 is
suspended until sixty days after the Tax Court's decision becomes
final.13 ' Generally, the Tax Court's decision becomes final when the
time allowed for filing a notice of appeal expires, that is, ninety days
after the Tax Court's decision is entered.' 32
The court in Pesko v. United States 133 interpreted the interaction of
these rules to determine whether the ninety-day period of section
124. Id. at 9.
125. Id. at 6 (citing Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689 (1966) (defining necessary
business expenses as "appropriate" and "helpful" to business)).
126. See Danville Plywood Corp. v. United States, 899 F.2d 3, 6 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (citing
Deputy v. duPont, 308 U.S. 488, 495 (1940) (examining what constitutes "normal" business
expenditure)).
127. See Danville Plywood Corp., 899 F.2d at 6 (citing Welsh v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113-
14 (1933) (distinguishing ordinary expenses from other types of expenses)); see also I.R.C.
§ 167 (1986) (discussing depreciation of capitalized assets).
128. Danville Plywood Corp., 899 F.2d at 9 (declaring court's finding in light of standard
applied).
129. I.R.C. § 6213(a) (1986). The notice of deficiency informs the taxpayer that the IRS
believes he or she owes additional tax and that the IRS will commence an action for collection
90 days after the date of the notice unless the taxpayer files a Tax Court petition or pays the
tax. Id. § 6212(a).
130. Generally, tax must be assessed within three years after filing a return. Id. § 6501(a).
131. See id. § 6503(a)(1) (explaining suspension procedure).
132. See id. § 7481 (providing time when court decisions become final); see also id. § 7483
(setting expiration of period to file notice of appeal). Note that the 60-day period of
§ 6503(a)(1) and the 90 day period of § 7481(b) total to 150 days.
133. 918 F.2d 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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6213(a) terminated upon entry of a stipulated Tax Court decision
containing a waiver of restrictions on assessment. 3 4 During an au-
dit of the taxpayers' 1970 individual income tax return, the taxpay-
ers consented to extend the statute of limitation on assessment from
April 15, 1974 to December 31, 1975.135 On December 24, 1975,
the IRS issued a notice of deficiency to the taxpayers, who subse-
quently filed a petition in the Tax Court to redetermine the pro-
posed deficiency. 136 The parties eventually agreed to a stipulated
settlement of the dispute.13 7 Consequently, on April 29, 1985, the
Tax Court entered a stipulated decision settling the amount the tax-
payers owed.138 The taxpayers also signed a waiver permitting the
IRS to assess the agreed amount of tax upon entry of the Tax
Court's decision without requiring the IRS to send a notice of defi-
ciency.1 39 On October 4, 1985, the IRS sent a notice to the taxpayer
that demanded payment. The notice reflected an assessment date of
September 24, 1985, 148 days after the April 29 Tax Court
decision. ' 40
A dispute arose concerning when the Tax Court decision became
final for purposes of section 6503(a)(1). If the decision became final
ninety days after entry (i.e. July 29), then the assessment was timely
because the IRS would have a total of 150 days from April 29 to
make the assessment.' 4' The taxpayers contended that the waiver
of restrictions on assessment under section 6213(a) finalized the
Tax Court judgment immediately upon entry of the stipulated
agreement on April 29, 1985, and not ninety days thereafter. 42
134. Pesko v. United States, 918 F.2d 1581, 1581 (6th Cir. 1990), aff'g 19 Cl. Ct. 687
(1990).
135. Id.; see also I.R.C. § 6213(c)(4) (1986) (explaining that taxpayer may voluntarily agree
to extend statute of limitation by signing Form 872 (Consent Fixing Period of Limitation
Upon Assessment of Income Tax)); see also IRS Form 872, reprinted in 1 IRS Forms 870.1
(BNA) (Sept. 24, 1990) (reprinting form used to extend statute of limitation).
136. Pesko, 918 F.2d at 1582.
137. Id. (indicating settlement decision).
138. See id (setting forth stipulated agreement). The agreement provided in part:
It is further stipulated that, effective upon the entry of the decision by the Court,
[taxpayers] waive the restriction contained in [I.R.C. section 6213(a)] prohibiting as-
sessment and collection of the deficiency (plus statutory interest) until the decision
of the Tax Court has become final.
Id
139. See id at 1583 (explaining other waiver factors); see also I.R.C. § 6213(d) (1986) (per-
mitting taxpayer to waive right to notice of deficiency provided for in section 6213(a) and
allowing IRS to assess immediately tax deficiency).
140. See Pesko v. United States, 19 CI. Ct. 687, 688 (1990) (discussing assessment period).
141. See I.R.C. § 7483 (1986) (providing 90 days to file appeal notice); see also id.
§ 6503(a)(1) (providing IRS additional 60 days to assess underpayment once Tax Court deci-
sion is final).
142. See Pesko v. United States, 918 F.2d 1581, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (setting forth tax-
payer's claim of untimeliness).
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Thus, the taxpayers argued, the assessment was not timely because
the IRS had only sixty days from this date to make the assessment.
In rejecting this argument, the court found that the taxpayers'
waiver simply accelerated assessment under section 6213(a) and did
not change the date that the Tax Court's decision became final. 143
In affirming the government's position, the court looked to Security
Industrial Insurance Co. v. United States 144 and Sherry Frontenac, Inc. v.
United States, 145 cases in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, respectively,
that considered this issue under similar facts.' 46 The Pesko court,
like the Fifth Circuit in Security Industrial, distinguished United States
v. Shepard's Estate,147 which suggested that a stipulated Tax Court
decision became final upon date of entry rather than ninety days
thereafter.148 However, the direct issue of whether a stipulated de-
cision becomes final upon entry rather than ninety days thereafter
was not raised in Shepard's Estate as it had been in Security Industrial
and Sherry Frontenac, Inc. The Pesko court, therefore, based its deci-
sion on the reasoning of those cases that had squarely faced the
same issue.
The Pesko court also distinguished Elizalde v. Commissioner.149 In
Elizalde, the Tax Court indicated that a stipulated decision becomes
final upon entry without regard to the ninety-day period provided
143. See id. at 1583 (explaining court's reasoning).
144. 830 F.2d 581 (5th Cir. 1987).
145. 868 F.2d 420 (11th Cir. 1989).
146. In Security Industrial Insurance Co., the taxpayer contended that, because stipulated de-
cisions cannot be appealed, a stipulated Tax Court decision that is not appealed is final on the
date of entry, rather than 90 days thereafter. Security Indus. Ins. Co. v. United States, 830
F.2d 581, 585 (5th Cir. 1987) (setting out taxpayer's contention). The Fifth Circuit rejected
this argument and held the final date of a stipulated decision is the same as for any Tax Court
decision that is not appealed, i.e., 90 days after the date of entry. Id. at 586. In so holding, the
Fifth Circuit found that the date of finality provided in sections 7481 and 7483 encompasses
all Tax Court cases, whether stipulated or not. Further, the court decided that the 90-day
period of section 7483 must be included in the statute of limitation under section 6503 in
stipulated Tax Court decisions because taxpayers do, in fact, appeal stipulated decisions. Id.
For instance, the taxpayer might appeal under the belief that the Tax Court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction. Id.
Similarly, in Sheny Frontenac, Inc., under facts Identical to those in Pesko, the Eleventh Circuit
rejected the taxpayer's argument that the 90 day period established in sections 7481 and 7483
was inapplicable to a stipulated Tax Court decision. Sherry Frontenac, Inc. v. United States,
868 F.2d 420, 423 (11 th Cir. 1989) (presenting facts and explaining inapplicability of 90-day
provision to stipulated decisions); see also Becker Bros., Inc. v. United States, 88-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) 9262, at 83,600 (C.D. Ill. 1988) (finding that IRS is permitted 90 days from date
on which stipulated Tax Court decision is entered along with 60-day period of § 6503 to
assess tax).
147. 319 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1963).
148. United States v. Shepard's Estate, 319 F.2d 699, 700 (2d Cir. 1963) (making this
suggestion); see also Security Indus. Ins. Co. v. United States, 830 F.2d 581, 584 n.7 (5th Cir.
198 1) (distinguishing Shepard's Estate).
149. 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 28 (1984).
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for in sections 7481 (a)(1) and 7483.150 As in Shepard's Estate, how-
ever, the primary issue in Elizalde concerned fraudulent transfers
and was unrelated to the statute of limitation issue raised in Pesko.
The litigants did not address the statute of limitation issue briefly
mentioned in Elizalde, and the assessment in question was found
timely.
The Pesko court also pointed out that the taxpayers' reliance on
Revenue Ruling 66-17 was misplaced.151 Under the facts of this
Ruling, a taxpayer received a notice of deficiency and promptly
waived the ninety-day restriction on assessment under section
6213(a) without filing a Tax Court petition. The Service held that
the suspension period of section 6503(a) terminated sixty days after
receipt of the waiver.' 52 This ruling, however, never reached the
central concern of the Pesko court-finality.
Finally, the Pesko court found ironic the taxpayers' claim that the
assessment of the IRS violated some standard of fair play and de-
cency when, in fact, the taxpayers were attempting to avoid an ad-
mitted liability through a legal technicality.15 3 The taxpayers and
the IRS entered into a compromise of the taxpayers' liability that the
taxpayers knew would result in an assessment. Therefore, if this
case were to be decided by the equities of the circumstances, the
court noted that the IRS, not the taxpayers, should prevail. 54 The
court's holding and its rejection of the taxpayers' arguments, when
coupled with similar decisions in other circuits, should dissuade
other taxpayers from raising this issue in other jurisdictions.
VI. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
During 1990, the Federal Circuit decided several cases that in-
volved procedural issues, none of which dealt directly with tax is-
sues.' 55 Of these decisions, perhaps the most significant involved
the meaning of the term "prevailing party" for purposes of award-
ing court costs to the government following a finding that the tax-
150. Elizalde v. Commissioner, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 28, 35 (1984) (discussing finality of
decision).
151. Rev. Rul. 66-17, 1966-1 C.B. 272, 272.
152. Id. at 274 (explaining finality).
153. See Pesko v. United States, 918 F.2d 1581, 1585 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (finding no sympa-
thy for taxpayers who abuse system).
154. Id.
155. See, e.g., Murray v. United States, 918 F.2d 185 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (reversing lower
court's decision based on question of subject matterjurisdiction); Taylor v. United States, 915
F.2d 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (agreeing with Claims Court that it lacked jurisdiction); Schiff v.
United States, 914 F.2d 271 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (affirming Claims Court's dismissal); Carter v.
United States, 909 F.2d 1452 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (upholding lower court's ruling on subject
matter jurisdiction).
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payer was liable for section 6672 employment taxes. The others
dealt generally with the issue of the Claims Court's jurisdiction over
a tax dispute.
A. Prevailing Party
In Schultz v. United States,156 the court upheld a Claims Court
award of costs against appellant Schultz.' 57 The lower court had
ordered Schultz to pay the costs of his trial under Claims Court Rule
54(d).15 8 The substantive legal issue considered by the Claims
Court was whether the appellant was subject to the 100% penalty
imposed by section 6672.159 The Claims Court applied the "re-
sponsible person" standard of liability by applying a two-part test:
(1) whether the taxpayer had a duty to collect and pay income and
Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) taxes to the federal
government, and if so, (2) whether the failure to pay was willful.' 60
The Claims Court, after weighing the evidence, concluded that
Schultz was a corporate officer who was a "responsible person"
within the meaning of section 6672 and that his failure to pay was
willful. 16  The Claims Court, however, abated the government's
claim by $4,776.88, which represented the amount paid by another
former officer and responsible person of the corporation. 162 Ulti-
mately, the government accepted $9,624.94 from Schultz in full sat-
isfaction of his claim.' 6 3
Although Schultz appealed all of the trial court's findings, the
Federal Circuit addressed only the propriety of the award of costs
against the plaintiff. Schultz argued that the government did not
"prevail" for purposes of assessing costs because the government
156. 918 F.2d 164 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
157. Schultz v. United States, 918 F.2d 164, 167 (Fed. Cir.), aff'g 19 CI. Ct. 280 (1990).
158. See Schultz v. United States, 19 Cl. Ct. 280, 280 (1990) (setting forth lower court's
opinion in detail); see also CL. CT. R. 54(d) (stating that "costs shall be allowed as a matter of
course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs").
159. Schultz, 19 Cl. Ct. at 280 (addressing penalty assessment question). To enforce col-
lection when a corporate employer does not pay its employment taxes, section 6672(a) im-
poses personal liability on persons responsible for ensuring that taxes are paid. I.R.C.
§ 6672(a) (1986). In essence, any person required by law to collect, account for, and pay any
tax who "willfully fails to collect such tax, or truthfully account for and pay over such tax, or
willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any such tax or the payment thereof" must
pay a penalty in the amount of the tax evaded, not collected, or not accounted for and paid.
Id.
160. See Schultz, 19 Cl. Ct. at 290 (invoking "responsible person" test). The term "respon-
sible person" is not actually found in the Code; rather, it was developed by the courts as a
matter of convenience. See Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 246 n.7 (1978) (setting
forth "responsible person" standard).
161. See Schultz, 19 Cl. Ct. at 290 (applying "responsible person" test to taxpayer).
162. Id.
163. Schultz v. United States, 918 F.2d 164, 165 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (providing background).
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had accepted an amount less than the amount of its original
claim.164
The court found the law on this issue to be well settled. Gener-
ally, the Claims Court's Rules provide that litigation costs are
awarded to the prevailing party. 165 In holding in the government's
favor, the court looked to analogous cases and statutes for defini-
tions of the term, prevailing party, 166 and found that for purposes of
awarding costs, a party need not prevail on all issues to be deemed
the prevailing party.' 67 In essence, the taxpayer asked the court to
look at the amount of the government's settlement of the taxpayer's
suit, rather than at the taxpayer's potential liability. Thus, the tax-
payer reasoned that because the government accepted $4,776.88
less than it had initially claimed, he must have "won" in some
manner. 168
The Federal Circuit rejected this argument and instead held that
the proper method to determine the prevailing party is to look at
who prevails on the central issues.' 69 The court found the central
issues in this case to be: (1) whether the taxpayer was a "responsi-
ble person," and (2) whether his failure to pay was willful.' 7 0 The
trial court found for the government on both issues, making it the
"prevailing party" for Rule 54(d) purposes.' 7 '
164. It at 166.
165. See CL. CT. R. 54(d) (allocating costs).
166. See Schultz, 918 F.2d at 167 (looking to other cases). The court noted that the lan-
guage of Claims Court Rule 54(d) is nearly identical to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d),
and is similar to the language in the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(d)(1)(A) (1990). As a result, the court cited cases defining prevailing party under
these analogous statutes. As authority to cite analogous decisions as precedent, the court
pointed to Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 n.7 (1983), which held that the "standards
set forth in this opinion are generally applicable in all cases" where a prevailing party may be
entitled to an award. Schultz, 918 F.2d at 164 n'2.
167. See United States v. Mitchell, 580 F.2d 789, 793 (5th Cir. 1978) (commenting that
"party need not prevail on all issues to justify a full award of costs"); Lodges 743 & 1746 Int'l
Ass'n of Machinists v. United Aircraft Corp., 534 F.2d 422, 448 (2d Cir. 1974) (stating that
"[i]t is axiomatic that a plaintiff need not sustain his entire claim to be regarded as the prevail-
ing party"), cert. denied sub nom. Lodge 743 & 1746 v. NLRB, 429 U.S. 825, 825 (1976); K-2 Ski
Co. v. Head Ski Co., 506 F.2d 471, 477 (9th Cir. 1974) (awarding plaintiff costs even though
plaintiff prevailed on only two of twelve trade secrets claims); see also Austin v. Department of
Commerce, 742 F.2d 1417, 1419 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (stating that although EAJA does not define
prevailing party, "typical formulation is that plaintiffs may be considered 'prevailing parties'
for attorney fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves
some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing the suit") (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart,
461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (emphasis added)).
168. Schultz, 918 F.2d at 166 (explaining taxpayer's approach to Claims Court appeals
proceeding).
169. Id. (citing Hensly, 461 U.S. at 433 n.8 (stating that "proper focus is whether the
plaintiff has been successful on the central issue as exhibited by the fact that he has acquired
the primary relief sought") (quoting Taylor v. Sterrett, 640 F.2d 663, 669 (5th Cir. 1981))).
170. Id. at 166 (describing issues on which government prevailed as "controlling").
171. Id. at 166 & n.3 (reviewing role of controlling issues in trial court to clarify "correct
vantage point" for prevailing party determination).
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An interesting question arises in comparing the prevailing party
standard of Claims Court Rule 54(d) with the standard set forth in
section 7430.172 Section 7430 permits a taxpayer who is a prevailing
party to recover costs and attorneys' fees only when he "substan-
tially" prevails.173 Under this provision, the taxpayer must substan-
tially prevail as to either amount' 74 or the "most significant issue or
set of issues" to be deemed the prevailing party.' 75 The court in
Schultz properly applied the (presumably lower) prevailing party
standard of Claims Court Rule 54(d) because section 7430 applies
only where the prevailing party is someone other than the United
States or a creditor of the taxpayer.' 76 Where the award is against
the government, however, the Claims Court and the Federal Circuit
should evaluate the two standards carefully to reconcile, if possible,
any inconsistencies in their application.' 77 Regardless of the choice
of a standard for awarding costs in a tax controversy, this case illus-
trates that a taxpayer will have to prevail on at least some substan-
tive issues to avoid an award of litigation costs to the government.
B. Jurisdiction of the Claims Court
In general, a claim may not be brought before a federal district
court or the Claims Court if the taxpayer fails to meet any one of the
three jurisdictional prerequisites: (1) filing of a timely administra-
tive claim for refund, 178 (2) paying in full any assessed tax,' 79 and
172. Compare CL. CT. R. 54(d) (allowing costs to prevailing parties as matter "of course")
with I.R.C. § 7430(a) (1986) (allowing taxpayer recovery of only specified costs). Costs recov-
erable by virtue of section 7430(a) include "reasonable administrative costs incurred in con-
nection with such administrative proceeding within the [I.R.S.]" and "reasonable litigation
costs incurred in connection with such court proceeding." Id. § 7430(a).
173. See I.R.C. § 7430(c)(4) (1986) (defining prevailing party for federal tax purposes). A
prevailing party is a party to a proceeding described in section 7430(a) who "establishes that
the position of the United States in the proceeding was not substantially justified" and who
has either "substantially prevailed with respect to the amount in controversy" or has "sub-
stantially prevailed with respect to the most significant issue or set of issues presented." 1d;
see also id. § 7430(a) (allowing cost recovery for any "administrative or court proceeding...
brought by or against the United States in connection with the determination, collection, or
refund of any tax, interest, or penalty"). The determination as to who is a prevailing party
may be made "by agreement of the parties", by the IRS, or by the court. See id
§ 7430(c)(4)(B) (setting out method to determine prevailing party status).
174. See id. § 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii)(I) (elaborating on prevailing party definition).
175. See id § 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii)(II) (expanding prevailing party definition with alternate
ground to determine status).
176. See Schultz v. United States, 918 F.2d 164, 164-66 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (examining
Claims Court's application of Rule 54(d) and basing Federal Circuit's finding on application
of same rule); see also I.R.C. § 7430(c)(4)(A) (1986) (defining scope of application of prevailing
party definition).
177. Interestingly, the Tax Court Rules incorporate the "substantially prevail" standard
of section 7430(c)(4). See U.S. TAx CT. R. 232(c) (providing for disposition of costs and allo-
cating burden to moving party to show that party "substantially prevailed").
178. See I.R.C. § 7422(a) (1986) (stating that no court may maintain an action to recover
"any revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected" until
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(3) meeting prescribed time limits within which a suit must be
brought.18 0 In three unpublished opinions, the Federal Circuit ad-
dressed these jurisdictional requirements.' 8
In Schiflv. United States,'8 2 the taxpayer filed a claim for refund on
April 4, 1988.183 The facts surrounding the taxpayer's refund claim
were undisputed.' 8 4 The issue was whether the tax (plus penalties
and interest) had been paid within two years prior to this filing date,
thus enabling the taxpayer to claim a refund within the statute of
limitations.' 8 5 In connection with the taxpayer's 1975 tax year, the
IRS assessed $1,380 on March 25, 1985, in complete satisfaction of
his liability for the earlier year.' 86 Taxpayers generally must file re-
fund claims no later than three years from the time the), file their tax
return, or as in this case, two years from the time the tax is paid.' 8 7
Consequently, the taxpayer cannot sue the United States for a re-
fund where a timely refund claim has not been filed.'18  In Schiff, the
taxpayer contended that his refund claim was timely in that a $190
interest assessment attributable to taxes collected from tax year
taxpayer files refund or credit claim with the Secretary); see also id § 6511 (a) (setting forth as
limitation to filing claim within later of three years from date return filed or two years from
date tax paid or "if no return was filed by the taxpayer, within [two) years from the time"
taxpayer paid tax).
179. See Flora v. United States, 357 U.S. 63, 69-75 (1958) (interpreting 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(a)(1) (1990) as requiring full payment before federal courts have jurisdiction to hear
claim brought against United States). There are certain exceptions to this requirement. For
example, sections 6694(c) and 6703(c) permit taxpayers to file suit against the United States
after only 15% of certain penalties have been paid. See I.R.C. § 6694(c) (1986) (providing
that if taxpayer files refund claims and has paid at least 15% of contested amount, action for
collection of remainder will not occur until filed claim resolved); id. § 6703(c) (providing simi-
lar extension of collection period).
180. See I.R.C. § 6532(a) (1986) (setting time limits to bring suit). Generally, "[n]o suit or
proceeding... for the recovery of any internal revenue tax, penalty, or other sum, shall be
begun before the expiration of 6 months from the date of filing the claim .... Id. In
addition, no claim may be brought "after the expiration of [two] years from the date of mail-
ing by certified mail or registered mail by the Secretary to the taxpayer of a notice of the
disallowance of the part of the claim to which the suit or proceeding relates." Id.
181. See FED. CIR. R. 47.8 (specifying that unpublished decisions may not be employed as
precedent except in matters on same case such as res judicata).
182. No. 90-5025, slip op. at I (Fed. Cir. Aug. 21, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, CAFC
file).
183. Schiffv. United States, No. 90-5025, slip op. at 1 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 21, 1990) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, CAFC file).
184. The taxpayer was a "tax protester" who had refused to pay income taxes for several
years and published a book entitled How Anyone Can Stop Paying Income Taxes. See Schiff v.
Commissioner, 751 F.2d 116, 116 (2d Cir. 1984) (upholding IRS assessment of additional
taxes for failure to pay and fraudulent underpayment, and assessing double costs and dam-
ages), aff'g 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 1706 (1984).
185. Schi, No. 90-5025, slip op. at 2-3 (stating issue of case).
186. Id at 3.
187. See I.R.C. § 6511 (1986) (providing period of limitation on filing credit or refund
claim).
188. See id § 7422 (maintaining that taxpayers may not bring suit prior to filing refund
claim).
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1975 was recorded on May 15, 1986, bringing April 4, 1988 within
the permitted filing time.18 9
The issue in the case was whether the interest assessment was a
separate payment, and therefore subject to its own two-year statute
of limitation for refunds, or whether it was merely a reclassification
of an assessment that was made on March 25, 1985.190 The Federal
Circuit, applying a clearly erroneous standard, refused to overturn
the Claims Court opinion that determined Schiff's tax liability was
fully paid on March 25, 1985, and characterized the subsequent as-
sessment of interest on May 15, 1986 as a mere reclassification of
the prior assessment. 191 The court also affirmed the imposition of
sanctions 192 on Schiff for abusing the judicial process by filing a friv-
olous appeal because all 'of the substantive theories he advanced had
been explicitly rejected by the courts, not only in unrelated cases,
but in cases where Schiff himself was a party. 193
The second case in which the Federal Circuit addressed ajurisdic-
tional question was in Murray v. United States.' 94 In Murray, the Fed-
eral Circuit overturned the Claims Court's dismissal of a refund suit.
The Claims Court had dismissed the taxpayer's action sua sponte be-
cause it concluded that the taxpayer had failed to pay the entire
amount assessed against him for his 1985 tax liability.'9 5 The Fed-
eral Circuit overturned the Claims Court holding by finding that in
subject matter jurisdiction dismissal actions, the court must take as
true all allegations in the complaint. 196 In addition, all inferences
must be interpreted in favor of the party whose action would be dis-
189. Schif, No. 90-5025, slip op. at 4.
190. See id (pointing out critical issue was whether assessment of interest qualified as sep-
arate payment).
191. Id (citing Heisig v. United States, 719 F.2d 1153, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (setting forth
Federal Circuit standard of review as clearly erroneous)).
192. See FED. R. APP. P. 38 (authorizing damages and costs against filers of frivolous
appeals).
193. See Schiff v. United States, No. 90-5025, slip op. at 5-6 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 21, 1990)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, CAFC file) (reviewing these cases); see also United States v. Schiff, 801
F.2d 108, 110-12 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating that "disagreement with law is no defense to tax
violation"), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 945 (1987); Newman v. Schiff, 778 F.2d 460, 467 (8th Cir.
1985) (explaining that filing of federal income tax return is mandatory under section 6012);
United States v. Schiff, 612 F.2d 73, 83 (2d Cir. 1979) (finding fifth amendment privilege
unavailable against all disclosures on income tax return).
194. No. 90-5068, slip op. at 1 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 2, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, CAFC
file).
195. Murray v. United States, No. 90-5068, slip op. at 1-2 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 2, 1990) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, CAFC file) (citing Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 146 (1960) (stating
rule that entire amount assessed must be paid and refund sought before Claims Court has
jurisdiction)).
196. Murray, No. 90-5068, slip op. at 3 (setting forth proper standard in actions for sub-
ject matter jurisdiction dismissal).
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missed.197 Applying this standard, the court found that the record
indicated the possibility that the 1985 tax liability had been entirely
paid, thereby enabling the taxpayer to bring his claim.' 9 8
The final case in which the Federal Circuit addressed a jurisdic-
tional question was Taylor v. United States. 199 In Taylor, the Federal
Circuit partly affirmed and partly reversed and remanded the Claims
Court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction over petitioner's refund
claims. The appellant filed suit in the Claims Court onJune 3, 1988,
claiming income tax overpayments for 1982, 1985, 1986, and
1987.200 The Federal Circuit affirmed the Claims Court summary
judgment ruling that it lacked jurisdiction with respect to the 1985,
1986, and 1987 tax years because the appellant failed to file a refund
claim with the IRS before filing the Claims Court suit.20 1 With re-
spect to the 1982 year, however, the court overturned the Claims
Court ruling that it lacked jurisdiction on the grounds that the tax-
payer had failed to file a claim for refund within the limitation pe-
riod of section 6511. 202 The court found that the refund claim
attributable to tax year 1982 arose out of a credit of an overpayment
on the taxpayer's 1985 return applied on April 14, 1986.203 Conse-
quently, the taxpayer's refund claim on April 20, 1987 was timely
under the two year statute of limitations of section 6511 (a), and the
Court remanded the case with respect to tax year 1982.204
CONCLUSION
The court found for the taxpayer in only two of the thirteen tax
decisions handed down by the Federal Circuit this term.20 5 One
197. Ia
198. Id at 3-4 (making finding based on facts of case). The Court found two items of
evidence supporting the petitioner's contentions: (1) the original complaint alleged complete
payment, and (2) other evidence, including an attorney's letter and a check corroborating this
claim. L
199. No. 90-5050, slip op. at 1 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 25, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, CAFC
file).
200. Taylor v. United States, No. 90-5050, slip op. at 1 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 25, 1990) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, CAFC file) (recounting procedural history), aff'g 18 CI. Ct. 713 (1989).
201. See I.R.C. § 7422(a) (1986) (requiring filing of claim to bring suit).
202. Taylor, No. 90-5050, slip op. at 2; see also supra note 187 (discussing § 6511).
203. Taylor, No. 90-5050, slip op. at 2 (citing I.R.C. § 6402 (1986) (concerning tax refunds
or credits) and id. I.R.C. § 6407 (1986) (concerning date of allowance of refund or credit)).
204. Taylor, No. 90-5050, slip op. at 2-3. In a footnote, the Claims Court stated that sum-
mary judgment would have been granted to the government even if it had found the 1982
refund claim timely because the taxpayer offered no evidence to support its refund claim. See
Taylor v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 713, 717 n.3 (1989) (stating holding below). The Federal
Circuit, however, apparently remanded in order to allow the Claims Court to determine
whether such a claim was made and whether this would entitle the taxpayer to file suit under
sections 6511 (a) and 7422(a). See Taylor, No. 90-5050, slip op. at 2-3 (remanding case).
205. Murray v. United States, No. 90-5068, slip op. at 1 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 2, 1990) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, CAFC file); Schiffv. United States, No. 90-5025, slip op. at 1 (Fed. Cir. Aug.
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legal scholar suggests that the Claims Court is a useful arena to
bring "test cases" for those federal tax issues which apply to a large
number of taxpayers in a variety of circuits because the only appeal
is to the Federal Circuit. 206 Before proceeding with their claims,
taxpayers should, therefore, take notice that most of this term's de-
cisions favored the government and plan accordingly.
21, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, CAFC file); see also supra notes 182-93 and accompanying
text (discussing Schif/) and notes 194-98 and accompanying text (discussing Murray).
206. See Refund Litigation, 124-4th Tax Mgmt. (BNA) at A-8 (Dec. 17, 1990) (examining
advantages of Claims Court as test case forum). This remark is especially true where taxpay-
ers from different circuits seek to resolve the same issue. If one taxpayer succeeds in the
Federal Circuit, the Claims Court would be bound to follow that ruling in subsequent cases
on the same issue.

